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Abstract 
In this paper, we  will show that the capitalist-spirit approach to economic growth has 
been developed by Adam Smith, Karl  Marx,  Max Weber and John Maynard Keynes 
and  many others.  It can  be demonstrated that  countries with different degree  of  the 
capitalist  spirit  will  have  different  per  capita  consumption,  per  capita  capital  stock 
and  different  endogenous  growth rates in the  long  run. This capitalist spirit  model is 
also widely supported  by many empirical  and historical studies on cultural  attributes 
and economic development. 
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1.  Introduction 
Traditional optimal growth models such as  Phelps (1961), Cass (1965) and 
Koopmans  (1965)  have  demonstrated  that,  with  a  typical  neoclassical 
production  function  and  an  exogenously  given  time  discount  factor,  the 
maximization  of  an additive  utility  function  defined on per capita  consump­
tion by a representative  agent or family leads to  a unique  steady state where 
the net marginal  productivity  of  capital equals the time discount  rate.  If two 
countries have the same technology and the same discount rate, it is expected 
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that  per  capita  consumption,  per  capita  capital  stock,  the  saving  rate  and 
returns on capital are all equalized in steady state. 
This well-known convergence theorem of economic growth has  been faced 
with  a  growing  number  of  challenges  in  recent  years.  Empirically,  the 
convergence theorem  cannot  explain  several puzzling  economic  facts: (i) why 
the  growth  rates  in some  developing  countries  with  Confucian  culture,  like 
four  East  Asian  'miracles'  of  South  Korea,  Taiwan,  Hong  Kong  and 
Singapore are so high  and the  rates in some developing countries so low;  (ii) 
why  the  relative  income  gap  between  developed  countries  and  developing 
countries is getting wider rather than narrowing; (iii) why  productivity levels 
have  not  converged;  and  (iv)  why  the  nations  with  Protestant  religious 
establishment  in  1870  had  1979  per  capita  income  more  than  one-third 
higher  than  the  nations  with  Catholic  religion  (DeLong,  1987). To  try  to 
answer  these  problems,  some  new  theories  have  emerged.  A  typical  starting 
point  for  these  new  theories  is  to  depart  from  the  usual  assumption  of 
diminishing  returns  (Romer,  1986;  Lucas,  1988).  Romer  (1986)  has  shown 
that,  under  increasing  returns  to  scale,  the  level  of  per  capita  income  m 
different countries need not converge. 
We  believe  that  culture  differences  among  countries,  in  addition  to 
technology, play an important role in the determination of economic growth, 
Here  our  alternative  growth  model  is  based  on  Max Weber's  theory of 'the 
spirit of capitalism' and a mathematical model  of  Kurz (1968).  In an  unduly 
neglected  paper  of  the  economics  profession,  Kurz  (1968)  deviates  from  the 
conventional  wisdom  of  economics  and  defines  utility  function  on  both 
consumption  and  capital  which  he  calls  wealth  effects.  As  we  will  see  in 
Section  2,  this  novel  definition  of  preference  function  reflects  the  essence  of 
the  spirit  of  capitalism:  the  continual  accumulation  of  wealth  for  its  own 
sake,  rather  than  for  the  material  rewards  that  it  can  serve  to  bring.  (We 
hasten  to  add  that  Kurz's  original  model  is  a  purely  technical  one  and  he 
does not offer any explanation or justification for his inclusion  of capital into 
the  preference. We  hope  that  our  reasoning  will  not  distort  Kurz's  original 
ideas.) 
As a result of  the presence of the so-called wealth effects in the  preference 
function, the steady-state capital stock is larger than the modified golden rule 
level,  and  the  forms  of  utility  functions  play  a  crucial  role  in  determining 
equilibrium  consumption  and  capital.  Therefore,  countries  with  the  same 
technology and the same  time  discount rate may have different  steady states 
depending on the difference in their wealth effects or their capitalist spirit. 
In  recent  contributions  to  endogenous  growth  theory,  the  technology  is 
often  assumed  to  be  constant  or  increasing  returns  in  capital  input.  To 
generate growth,  for  all  levels  of  capital stock,  the  net marginal product of 
capital is further assumed to be bounded below by the time discount rate. In 
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endogenous growth even though  the  net marginal product of capital can be 
smaller  than  the  time  discount  rate  or  can  go  to  zero  as  capital  increases 
without bound. Through a specific example, it is shown that the stronger the 
capitalist spirit, the higher the endogenous growth rate and the saving rate. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical relevance of the capitalist-spirit model. By 
citing  work  of  sociologists,  historians  and  economists,  we  will  see  that  the 
capitalist-spirit  approach  to  economic  growth  and  development  has  been 
widely used in many historical and empirical studies. 
We conclude this paper in Section 6 with a few remarks. 
2.  'The  spirit of capitalism'  and its  mathematical  representation 
Here  we  first  present  a  model  essentially  the  same  as  in  Kurz  (1968).  A 
representative  agent  maximizes  a  discounted  utility  over  an  infinite  time 






(  1) 
(2) 
where c  is  consumption,  k  is  capital stock, and  p  is  the  time discount rate 
and  O<p< 1.  f(k)  is  the  net  output  function  (=gross  output-capital 
depreciation).  A  dot  over  a  variable  denotes  time  derivative.  The  utility 
function has the following standard properties: 
u'(c) >O,  u"(c)<O,  u'(O)-+oo  and  u'(oo)-+0; 
v'(k)>O,  v"(k)<O,  v'(oo)-+0. 
The net output function f(k) is typically neoclassical: 
/(0)=0,  f'(k)>O,  f"(k)<O,  f'(O)-+oo,  f'(oo)-+0,  f(oo)-+oo, 
so  f(k) is strictly  concave;  and  when capital stock increases without bound, 
the net marginal product of capital goes to zero and the net output increases 
to infinity. 
The  optimal  path  of  capital  accumulation  is  described  by  the  following 
two dynamic equations: 
-u"(c)c=  v'(k)  +  u'(c)(f'(k)-p), 
k=  f(k)-c. 
(3) 
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Let the steady-state values be denoted as k. and c, then 




Two facts immediately  follow from these two  equations.  First,  the steady­
state  capital  stock  is  higher  than  one  at  the  modified  golden  rule  level.  To 
see  this,  we  compare  the  steady-state  condition  (4)  to  the  modified  golden 
rule in Cass ( 1965), 




< P = f'(kmg) 
u'(C) 
where kmg denotes the modified golden rule capital.  Since f"(k) < 0, v'(k) and 
u'(c) are positive for all k and c, k>kmg. Second, the steady-state capital is no 
longer  independent  of  the  preference  functions  as in the Cass  model.  In fact, 
even  if  different  countries  have  the  same  time  discount  rate and technology, 
the  difference  in  the  utility  functions  can  give  rise  to  different  per  capita 
capital stock and per capita consumption across countries in the long run. 
In  the  rest  of  this  section,  we  are  going  to  argue  why  the  inclusion  of 
capital or wealth into the  preference reflects 'the spirit of capitalism' in  Max 
Weber's sense and how some great economists in history have developed the 
same idea in their growth theories. 
In 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of  Capitalism', Weber (1958) defines 
capitalism  as the  rational  organization  of  formally  free  labour  (p.  21).  The 
essence of  the spirit of  capitalism is the continual accumulation  of wealth for 
its  own sake,  rather  than  only  for  the  material rewards  that  it  can serve  to 
bring (p. 4). 
'At  all  periods  of  history,  wherever  it  was  possible,  there  has  been  ruthless 
acquisition, bound to no ethical norms whatever'. But only in a capitalist economy, 
'man is dominated by the making of  money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose 
of  his life. Economic acquisition  is  no longer subordinated  to man  as the means  for the 
satisfaction  of  his  material  needs.  This  reversal  of  what  we  should  call  the  natural 
relationship, so irrational from a naive point of view, is evidently a leading  principle 
of  capitalism as it is foreign to all people not under capitalist influence' (p. 53, italic 
added.). 
Weber's  idea  is  clear:  capital  accumulation  in  a  capitalist  economy  is 
motivated  not  only  by the  maximization  of  the  long-run  consumption,  but 
also  by  the  enjoyment  (utility)  from  enhancing  wealth  itself.  This  capitalist 
spirit  approach  to  long-run  growth  has  been  also  taken  by  Adam  Smith 
(1937),  Karl  Marx  (1977)  and  John  Maynard  Keynes  (1971),  among  many 
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In  the  'Wealth  of  Nations',  Adam  Smith  (1937)  makes  the  following 
description of a capitalist society's savings behavior: 
The  principle  which  prompts  to  save,  is  the  desire  of  bettering  our  condition,  a 
desire  which  though  generally  calm  and  dispassionate,  comes  with  us  from  the 
womb,  and  never  leaves  us  till  we  go  into  the  grave  ... .  An  augmentation  of 
fortune is  the means by which the greater  part  of  men  propose  and  wish  to better 
their condition. It is  the means of the  most  vulgar and the  most  obvious; and  the 
most likely  way of augmenting their fortune, is to save and accumulate some part 
of  what  they  acquire,  either  regularly  and  annually, or  upon  some  extraordinary 
occasions.  Though  the  principle  of  expense,  therefore,  prevails  in  almost  all  men 
upon  some  occasions,  and  in  some  men  upon  almost  all  occasions,  yet  in  the 
greater  part  of  men,  taking  the  whole  course  of  their  life  at  an  average,  the 
principle  of  frugality  seems  not  only  to  predominate,  but  to  predominate  very 
greatly' (The  Wealth of Nations, pp. 324--325). 
Adam Smith is so occupied by the moral of savings, he declares that 'every 
prodigal  appears  to  be  a  public  enemy,  and  every  frugal  man  a  public 
benefactor' (p. 324). 
Karl  Marx  (1977)  also  shares  this  view  with  many  so-called  classical 
economists.  He  regards  the instinctive nature  of  accumulation by capitalists 
as an essential part of capitalism: 
"Accumulate, accumulate! That  is  Moses and the prophets!  'Industry furnishes  the 
material which saving  accumulates!' Therefore save, save, i.e., reconvert the greatest 
possible  portion  of  surplus-value  into  capital!  Accumulation  for  the  sake  of 
accumulation, production for the  sake  of  production:  this  is the formula in  which 
classical  economists  expressed  the  historical  mission  of  the  bourgeoisie  in  the 
period of its domination" (Capital, Vol.  1, p. 742). 
John  Maynard  Keynes (1971) develops the  same  idea  in his statement  of 
the 'psychology' of capitalist society.1  He says that 
'Europe  was  so  organised  socially  and  economically  as  to  secure  the  maximum 
accumulation  of  capital.  While  there  was  some  continuous  improvement  in  the 
daily conditions  of  life of the mass of the  population, society  was  so framed as to 
throw a great part of the increased income into the control of the  class  least  likely 
to  consume  it.  The new rich of the nineteenth century were not brought up to large 
expenditures, and preferred  the  power which  investment gave  them  to  the pleasures  of 
immediate consumption .... Herein lay, in fact, the main justification of the capitalist 
system.  If the rich had spent their new  wealth on  their own enjoyments, the world 
would long ago have found such a regime intolerable. But like bees they saved and 
accumulated,  not  less  to  the  advantage  of  the  whole  community  because  they 
themselves held narrow ends in prospect' (The Economic  Consequences  of the  Peace, 
p. 11, italic added). 
1 I  thank Jeffrey  Sachs  for  directing  my  attention  to Keynes' work  'The  Economic  Consequences 
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Keynes continues to describe the saving behavior of the capitalist class: 
They  "were  allowed  to  call  the  best  part  of  the  cake  theirs  and were theoretically 
free to consume it, on the tacit underlying condition that they consumed very little 
of it in  practice.  The  duty  of  'saving'  became  nine-tenths  of  virtue  and  the  growth  of 
the  cake  the  object  of  true  religion  ... .  And so the  cake increased; but  to  what  end 
was  not  clearly  contemplated.  Individuals  would  be  exhorted  not  so  much  to 
abstain  as  to  defer,  and  to  cultivate  the  pleasures  of  security  and  anticipation. 
Saving was for old age or for your children; but this was only in theory - the virtue 
of  the  cake  was  that  it  was  never  to be  consumed,  neither  by  you  nor  by  your 
children after you" (p.  12, italic added). 
Therefore,  defining  utility  on  both  consumption  and  capital  is  a  way  to 
model  the  nature  of  capitalism  mathematically.  In  this  respect,  for  space 
limitation,  we  add  only  one  more  excellent  passage  from  Gustav  Cassel 
(1924): 
'There is a formation of capital for which it is hardly possible to assign any concern 
about the future as motive. It cannot be said of the  leading capitalists who satisfy 
all  their  wants  of  any  consequence,  and  have  a  capital  the  returns  on  which 
guarantees  this  satisfaction  of  wants  for  all  time  to  them  and  their  families,  yet 
constantly set  aside  large  sum  to  increase  their  wealth, that  they  save  out  of the 
concern about the  future.  In these cases there must be some other motive.  It is the 
economic interest of the capitalist to increase his  wealth, and this  in time becomes 
an end in itself. The motives that are at work are numerous. The senseless cupidity 
that in times finds its sole pleasure in contemplating the growth of its wealth, and 
may very well be described as  an abnormal sluggishness of  spirit and a pathologi­
cal  impoverishment of the  emotional life, is certainly not the  sole explanation. The 
desire of splendor and of the  higher position in the society which the possession of 
great  wealth  assures,  the  stimulation  of  jealousy  of  other  men,  the  healthy  joy  of 
the  strong  man  in  successful  work  as  such,  in  ruling  large  masses,  in  influence 
especially- these are all factors that have to be taken into account' (The  Theory  of 
Social Economy, pp. 228-229). 
To define the  utility function on  both consumption and  capital  or wealth 
is  also  a  way  to  model  man  not  only  as  an  economic  animal,  but  also  a 
political animal. Ever since Aristotle, we are taught that 'man is by nature an 
animal of intended to live in a polis' (see Aristotle,  1958). Wealth or property 
provides  man  not  only  consumption  means  but  also  political  power  and 
social  prestige.  Possession  of wealth  is,  to  a  considerable  degree,  a  measure 
and  standard  of  a  person's  success  in  a  society.  Thus  capital  and  wealth 
directly  enter  to  the  utility  function  of  the  representative  agent  of  the 
capitalist  economy.  In a  recent  book  on  power,  Galbraith (1984),  following 
the  long tradition  of sociology  and  political science,  classifies wealth  as  one 
of  three  resources of  political power.  'In past time, so great  was the prestige 
of  property  that  . . .  it  accorded  power  to  its  possessor.  What  the  man  of 
wealth said or believed attracted the belief of others as a matter of course' (p. H.-f. Zou I European Journal of Political Economy 10  ( 1994) 279-293  285 
49).  To  this  day,  'wealth  per  se  no  longer  gives  automatic  access  to 
conditional  power.  The  rich  man  who  now  seeks  such  influence  hires  a 
public  relations  firm  to  win  others  to  his  beliefs.  Or  he  contributes  to  a 
politician or a  political  action committee  that  reflects his views.  Or he goes 
into  politics  himself  and  uses  his  property  not  to  purchase  votes  but  to 
persuade voters' (p. 50). 
This analysis agrees with Lord Acton's (1988) contention that: 'Power goes 
with  property'  (p.  572).  In  a  laisser-fa ire  capitalist  economy,  'freedom  of 
accumulation not only carries with it the possibility of cumulative increase in 
the  inequality  of  economic  power,  ...  in  addition,  economic  power confers 
power in other  forms,  including  the  political' (Knight,  1942,  p.  82).  Seeking 
high social position and power has been long  recognized as one of the most 
important  motivation  in  capital  accumulation.  In  the  discussion  related  to 
the spirit of capitalism, Weber (1958) explicitly states that 'the desire for the 
power  and  recognition which  the  mere  fact  of  wealth  brings  plays  its  part' 
(p. 70) in capital accumulation. 
So  much  is  the justification why we  should define a representative  agent's 
utility  function  on both  consumption  and  capital (or wealth).  We  turn  next 
to the relation between the capitalist spirit and endogenous growth. 
3.  'The  spirit  of capitalism'  and endogenous  growth 
Recent  contributions  to  endogenous  growth  theory  have  shown  that 
long-run  growth  rate  can  be  endogenously  determined  by  preference  and 
technology.  A  common  starting  point of  many models  is to  assume  that  the 
production  technology  is  increasing  or  constant  returns  to  scale  instead  of 
diminishing  returns:  e.g.,  Romer  (1986),  Lucas  (1988),  Barro  (1990)  and 
Rebelo  (1991).  In  a  convex  model  of  endogenous  growth,  while  allowing 
decreasing  returns  to  scale,  Jones  and  Manuelli  (1990)  assume  that  the  net 
marginal  product  of  capital  does  not  go  to  zero  as  the  stock  of  capital 
increases  without  bound.  In  fact,  in  all  these  models,  in  order  to  generate 
endogenous growth, it is required that the net marginal product of  capital is 
always  greater  than  the  time  discount  rate.  This  is  the  so-called  lower 
boundary condition on technology. 
We  are  going  to  show  that  the  inclusion  of  the  capitalist  spirit  into  the 
model  can  generate  endogenous  growth  without  this  lower  boundary  con­
dition.  In this section we will retain all the assumptions regarding the utility 
functions in the last section.  In the  following, unless otherwise noted, the net 
production function  is  strictly  concave  and,  when  capital  stock  increases  to 
infinity, the net output also increases to  infinity, but the net marginal product 
of capital can be less than the time discount rate, p: 
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From  the  last  section,  the  optimal  conditions  regarding  the  time  path  of 
consumption and capital accumulation can also be written as 
c  = {  v'(k)/u'(c) + [f'(k)- p  ]}11(c) -l, 
k= f(k)-c, 
where 11(c) is the coefficient of the absolute risk aversion: 
11(c)=  -u"(c)ju'(c). 
(6) 
(2) 
It  is  immediate  from  (6)  that,  if  there  is no  capitalist  spirit  and  v(k)  and 
v'(k) are zero, we go back to the standard Cass model: in the long run, as the 
net  marginal  product  of  capital  is  less  than  the  time  discount  rate,  p, 
consumption growth will stop when the net marginal product equals the time 
discount  rate,  i.e.,  f'(k) =  p.  All  the  new  endogenous  growth  models  have 
tried  to 'escape' from  this  rule  by modifying the technology such that the net 
marginal  product  of capital  is always larger than the time discount  rate (the 
lower boundary condition). With this lower boundary condition, capital and 
consumption will grow for ever. 
Due  to  the existence of capitalist spirit in our model, the lower boundary 
condition  is  not  necessary  for  unbounded  growth  of  capital  and 
consumption: 
Proposition  1.  Suppose  that  f'(k) + v'(k)ju'(f(k))  is  larger  than  the  time 
discount  rate  p  and  k  is  any  value  satisfying  the  inequality:  f'(k) < p.  Then 
consumption and capital will rise for ever. 
Proof  In  Eq.  (6),  if  f'(k) :?> p,  the  right-hand  side  will  be  positive  and 
consumption  will  rise:  c > 0.  If  f'(k) < p,  and  suppose  that  there  exists  a 
stationary steady state, then, from k  =  0, f(k)  = c, and from c  =  0, 
v'(k)ju'(f(k)) + [f'(k)-p]  =  0.  (7) 
But  Eq.  (7)  cannot  hold  because  by  assumption,  f'(k) + v'(k)ju'(f(k)) > p  for 
any k satisfying f'(k) < p.  So c cannot be zero. The case that c is negative can 
be ruled out. This is because a negative c can happen only if c < f(k) for any 
value  of  k  that  is  higher  than  the  modified  golden  rule  level.  In  this  case, 
[v'(k)ju'(c)]  is less  than  [v'(k)ju'(f(k))]  for  u'(c) > u'(f(k)).  But  then,  k  in  (2) 
will  be  positive  for  f(  k) > c  and  capital  will  increase  to  infinity  at  the  same 
time when consumption keep decreasing. Sooner or later, the marginal utility 
of  consumption  will  be  significantly  higher  than  the  marginal  utility  of H.-f Zou /European Journal of Political Economy 10 ( 1994) 279-293  287 
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Fig.  1. P is the  optimal  path 
capital (for  v'(  oo )-+0)  and  the representative agent's  utility  can be raised  by 
reversing this process.  Therefore, the only optimal path is to  have consump­
tion increase for ever: c > 0.  But without an ever increasing capital stock, this 
ever growing consumption is not sustainable, so  k > 0 always.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition  1  implies  that,  to  have unbounded  growth,  it  is  essential  to 
require that, as both consumption and capital increase to infinity, the sum of 
the net marginal productivity of capital and the marginal rate of substitution 
between capital  and  consumption is larger than the  time  discount factor.  In 
particular, if the marginal rate of substitution between capital and consumption, 
v'(k)ju'(f(k)),  is larger than the time discount rate fo r all k such that  f'(k) < p, 
consumption  and  capital  will  keep  growing  even  though  the  net  marginal 
product of capital can go to zero when capital increases without bound. 
The  optimal  dynamic  path  is  depicted  the  phase  diagram  in Fig.  1.  In 
Fig.  1,  both curves  are  upward sloping  because the slope for  c=O  and  k=O 
are  positive  and  are  given  by  [v"(k*)+u'(c*)f"(k*)]ju"(c*)[p- f'(k*)]  and 
f'(k**),  respectively.  Here  c*  and k* denote  the  values of consumption  and 
capital  satisfying  the  equation  c = 0,  and  c**  and  k**  denotes  the  value  for 
k = 0,  or  f(k**)- c** = 0.  Given  the  condition  in  Proposition 1, there  is no 
intersection (i.e., no stationary steady state) for these two  curves.  Since both 
consumption  and  capital  are  increasing,  the  optimal  path,  P,  is bounded  in 
the region  between  k  = 0 and c = 0.  Below the curve k = 0,  c  is smaller  than 
f(k) and k is positive; above the curve c = 0, for given k*, c is larger than the 
value  of  consumption, c*,  which satisfies that  c = 0, so  c  will  be  positive  as 
u'(c) is deceasing in c,  c>c*, and v'(k*)ju'(c) is larger than v'(k*)ju'(c*). 288  H.-f Zou /  European Journal of Political Economy 10 ( 1994) 279-293 
4.  Two examples 
We  first  present  an  example  by  assuming  that  the net  output  is  constant 
returns to capital as in Barro (  1990) and Rebelo (  1991 ): 
f(k)  =  Ak. 
Just for simplicity, we let the utility functions be 
u(c)= loge,  v(k)=fJiogk. 
Here the parameter p is positive and it measures the capitalist spirit. 
To  generate endogenous growth in the Barro-Rebelo model, it is essential 
to have the net marginal product of capital be greater than the time discount 
rate: A>  p. This condition can be easily relaxed in our capitalist spirit model. 
In  fact,  let  A< p  and  so  f'(k)(  =A)< p.  Furthermore,  for  u(c) = log c  and 
v(k)  =  p log k,  v'(k)ju'(f(k))  =  fJA.  If  fJA > p  though  A< p,  by  Proposition  1, 
there will be endogenous growth.  But since  f'(k)  equals to A (A> 0) for all k, 
we have: 
Proposition 2.  Let  f(k)  =  Ak and A< p, then there will be endogenous growth 
if (1  +  fJ)A  is  larger  than  the  time  discount  rate  p;  and  the  balanced  growth 
rate, denoted as y, is given by: 
y  =A-p/(1  +  p). 
Proof  The current value Hamiltonian is 
H =loge+ {Jiogk+A.(Ak-c). 
Here ), is the costate variable. The optimal conditions are: 
(fJ/kA.)+A-p=  -A/A., 
(A  -1/kA.)  =  kjk. 
(8) 
(9) 
(  1  0) 
Differentiate  condition  (8)  with  respect  to  time  and  denote  the  constant 
growth rate of consumption as y: 
-A/A=  i:/c  =  y. 
Substitute y into (9): 
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Differentiate (  11) with respect to time on both sides: 
k/k=  -i!J.. =y . 
That is to say, the growth rate of capital on the balanced growth path is the 
same as the growth rate of consumption. Substitute k/k  =  y into (  10): 
(12) 
Then use (11) and (12) to solve for the balanced growth rate y: 
/J/(y + p  -A)  =(A  - y) - 1 
and 
y =A-p/(  1 + p).  (13) 
To  have  positive  growth  rate  in  (13),  A-p/(1 + /J)  needs  to  be  posthve, 
namely, (1  + p)A > p.  From Eq.  (13), the growth rate is higher if the  spirit of 
capitalism is stronger: 
Even if technology and the time discount rate are the same across countries, 
the growth rates will be different if the capitalist spirit is different. 
On the balanced growth path, the saving rate, s, is: 
s  = klf(k)  =(k/k)(k/Ak)  =  y/A  =  1-p/(1 + p)A.  (14) 
So the saving rate is an increasing function of the capitalist spirit: 
ds/dfJ  =  pj  A(  1 + p)2 > 0. 
As a second example, we let 
f(k)=k(t-a)  and  0<a<1,  (15) 
so  f'(k)--+0  as  k-+oo.  Let  u(c)= loge and v(k)=fJk",  then, if fJa>p,  c  and k 
will  be  positive  all  the  time.  To  see  this,  we  only  need  to  check  that  the 
condition in Proposition 1 is satisfied: 
v'(k)ju'{f(k))  =  fJak(a-t)k(l-a)  =  fJa. 
Thus  there exists  no  stationary  steady  state  if pa > p, and consumption and 
capital stock will keep rising. 290  H.-f Zou I European Journal of Political Economy 10 ( 1994) 279-293 
5.  The empirical relevance  of the capitalist-spirit model 
It is interesting to observe that we economists tend to explain growth and 
development by dealing with capital, labor  and  technology, while historians, 
political  scientists  and sociologists  pay  much  more  attention to the  cultural 
and  other  institutional  background  of  growth and  development.  That  might 
be  the  division  of  labor  among  intellectuals.  Our  model  is  an  attempt  to 
reconcile in part both stories told by economists and other social scientists. 
Since  Max Weber published  his  famous  study,  'The  Protestant  Ethic  and 
the  Spirit  of  Capitalism',  there  has  been  tremendous  accumulation of  litera­
ture  on  capitalist  spirit  and  its  relation  to  religions  and  wealth  creation. 
Though  sociologists  and  historians  (Weber,  1958;  Sombart,  1913, 1915; 
Tawney,  1926)  often  argue  more  about  which  religious  belief  leads  to 
capitalist  spirit,  the  positive  link  between  capitalist  spirit  and  wealth 
accumulation has been taken  for granted.  Recently there  are  even studies to 
provide  theological  justifications  for  the  capitalist  spirit.  For  interested 
readers,  a good collection is Berger's (1990)  'The  Capitalist  Spirit:  Toward a 
Religious Ethic of  Wealth Creation'. 
Empirically,  recent  examples  of  capitalist-spirit  approach  to  growth  and 
development are  numerous.  To cite  a  few,  there  are  Harrison's  (1985) study 
'Underdevelopment  Is  a  State  of  Mind',  Wiener's  (1981)  work  on the  decline 
of  British  industries:  English  Culture  and  the  Decline  of  the  Industrial  Spirit: 
1850--1980,  and MacFarquhar's  (1985)  study  on  the  four Asian  'miracles'  of 
South  Korea,  Taiwan,  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore:  The  Post-Confucian 
Challenge. 
Our  economics  profession  is  not  immune  from  this  capitalist-spirit 
approach. I quote two studies here. The first one is DeLong ( 1988). Contrary 
to  the  claim  made  by  Baumol  (  1986),  DeLong  finds  that  the  productivity 
levels  among  once-rich  twenty-two  countries  in  1870  did  not  converge  in 
1979.  In  fact,  'holding  constant  1870  per  capita  income,  nations  that  had 
Protestant religious establishments in 1870 had 1979 per capita income more 
than one-third higher than do nations that had Catholic establishments'. And 
he shows that 'there is one striking ex-ante association between growth over 
1870--1979  and  an  exogenous  variable:  a  nation's  dominant  religious  estab­
lishment  .. . .  A  religious  establishment  variable  that  is  one  for  Protestant, 
one-half  for  mixed,  and  zero  for  Catholic  nations  is  significantly  correlated 
with growth as long as measurement error variance is not too high'.  Indeed, 
'it  does  serve  as  an  example  of  how  culture  may  be  associated  with 
substantial  divergence  in  growth  performance'.  DeLong  is  not  the  first 
economist to put forward such  an argument.  Boulding  (1973) entitles one  of 
his  interesting  papers  as  'religious  foundations  of  economic  progress',  in 
which  he  argues  that  Protestant  ethic  has  not  only  influenced  the  develop­
ment of capitalism, but 'the Protestant ethic has contributed to the success of H.-f Zou ( European Journal of Political Economy 10 ( 1994) 279-293  291 
capitalist institutions,  particularly in regard to  their fostering  a high  rate  of 
economic progress' (p. 45). 
The  second  colorful  example  is  Morishima  (1982):  Why  Has  Japan 
'Succeeded'?.  Under this sensational title,  Morishima attributes the economic 
success  of  Japan  to  Western  technology  and  Japanese  Confucianism.  His 
approach  is  typical  Weberian  and  his  comparison  between  the  protestant 
ethic  and  the  Japanese  ethos  is  illuminating.  For  modern  capitalism  to  be 
established,  a  religious  revolution  had  to  come  first.  In  the  Western, 
'Puritanism's worldly frugality meant opposition to  enjoyment and consump­
tion, and luxury consumption especially was completely squeezed out. In this 
way  the  formation  of  capital was  carried  out  through  frugality;  new capital 
was  then  used  productively  and  became  a  new  source  of  profit.  Thus  the 
religious  revolution  resulting  from  Protestantism  created  the  modern  entre­
preneur and capitalism - a new type of person who was the possessor of an 
earnest  faith,  and  who  controlled  huge  wealth,  but  nevertheless  contended 
himself  with  a  life  of  extreme  simplicity,  striving  to  accumulate  capital' 
(pp. 83-84). 
'If the Japanese  had  not  adopted  the  belief  of  frugality, which  was  another  of  the 
prerequisites  of  capitalism,  then  modern  capitalism  could  certainly  not  have  been 
achieved in  Japan.  In  Japan  in those  days  Buddhism and  Shinto, the  traditional 
religions,  did  not  have  that  great  influence  on  the  everyday  life  of  the  Japanese 
people.  However,  ...  as  a  result  of  the  Tokugawa  Bakufu's  cultural  policy, 
Confucianism had spread widely and deeply among the Japanese people. Confucia­
nism was understood  in Japan  as an ethical  system  rather  than  a  religion, and  it 
directly  taught  the  Japanese  people  that  frugal  behavior  was  noble  behavior. 
Therefore  Japan,  at  the  end  of  the  Meiji  Revolution,  had  already  fulfilled  the 
second prerequisite for capitalism' (p. 86). 
Japan's  story  is  not  exceptional.  Now  South  Korea,  Taiwan,  Singapore 
and  Hong  Kong  are  following  the  Japanese  example.  As  observed  by 
MacFarquhar  (1985),  for  all  these  countries,  'the  significant  coincidence  is 
culture,  the  shared  heritage  of  centuries  of  inculcation  with  Confucianism. 
That  ideology  is  as  important  to  the  rise  of  the  east  Asian  hyper-growth 
economies  as  the conjunction of Protestantism  and  the rise  of  capitalism in 
the west'.  'Post-Confucian  economic man works hard  and plays hard, buys 
much, but saves more'. 
As  another  example  to  illustrate  how  change  in  the  capitalist  spirit  may 
affect  industrial  growth,  we  quote  from  Wiener  (1982):  English  Culture  and 
the  Decline  of  the  Industrial  Spirit,  1850--1980:  For  Britain,  Wiener  argues 
that,  after  the  Great  Exhibition  of  1851,  'social  and  psychological  currents 
began  to  flow  in  a  different  direction'  (p.  157).  'The  emerging  culture  of 
industrialism ...  was itself transformed. The thrust of new values  borne  along 
by  the  revolution  in industry  was contained in the  later  nineteenth  century; 
the  social  and  intellectual  revolution  implicit  in  industrialism  was  muted, 292  H.-f Zou /  European Journal of Political Economy 10 ( 1994)  279-293 
perhaps even aborted' (p.  157). 'For a century and a half the industrialist was 
an essential part of  English society, yet he was never quite sure of his place. 
The  educated public's suspicions of business and industry inevitably colored 
the self-image and goals of the business community.  Industrialists responded 
to  their  mental  environment,  sometimes  by  seeking  to  leave  the  world  of 
production for more acceptable realms of gentility, and sometimes by striving 
to  adapt their way of life to  the canons of gentility ... . As a rule, leaders of 
commerce  and  industry  in  England  over  the  past  century  have  accommo­
dated themselves to an elite culture  blended of preindustrial aristocratic and 
religious  values  and  more  recent  bureaucratic  values  that  inhibited  their 
quest  for  expansion,  productivity,  and  profit'  (p.  127).  The  gentrification  of 
the  industrialists  discouraged  'commitment  to  a  wholehearted  pursuit  of 
economic  growth'  (p.  127)  and  led  to  'the  waning  of  the  industrial  spirit' 
(p.  159) or the capitalist spirit. 
6.  Concluding remarks 
This paper has shown that a strong capitalist spirit can lead to unbounded 
growth of consumption and capital even though the net marginal product of 
capital is less than the time discount rate or  goes to zero when capital stock 
increases to infinity.  In doing this we have relaxed the technology condition 
required  in  many  endogenous  growth  models  and  at  the  same  time  inte­
grated two approaches to economic growth and development- the production­
technology approach and the cultural approach - into a single model. 
While we have mainly focused on the role of capitalist spirit in generating 
long-run  growth,  we  want  to  emphasize  that  our  model  is  strictly  comple­
mentary  to  many existing  models  which  have  more  or less  concentrated  on 
technology  and  productivity  progress.  In  fact,  as  the  capitalist-spirit  model 
just  adds  a  cultural  element  to  the  existing  models,  it  can  embody  all  the 
contributions  by  both  the  traditional  growth  theory  and  the  new  growth 
theory.  It  is  a  mistake  to  totally  ignore  the  cultural  elements  in  economic 
growth  and  development,  but  it  is  a  blunder  to  just  talk  about  culture 
without putting technology  in  its  right place.  This is  why  Morishima ( 1982) 
explains  the  successful  story  of  Japan  by  two  factors:  Western  technology 
and  Japanese  Confucianism.  The  balance  between  culture  and  technology 
should be always maintained. 
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